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LAURENCE S. LOCKE* 
THOMAS A. BOYLE, Ill** 
§ 7 .1. Application of Section 51A - Law in Effect at Time of Decision -
Amount of Compensation. During the Survey year, two decisions by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the applicability of 
chapter 252, section 51A, a 1969 amendment to the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. These decisions gave vitality to section 51 A, which had been a 
practical nullity. Section 51 A provides: "In any claim in which no com-
pensation has been paid prior to the final decision on such claim, said final 
decision shall take into consideration the compensation provided by stat-
ute on the date of the decision, rather than the date of the injury.'' 1 
Lack of judicial interpretation of the provision from 1969 until 1983 
gave rise to several questions regarding its application: (1) Despite the 
provisions of the amending act2 specifically providing that section 51A 
applied only to injuries occurring after the effective date of the statute, 
was there any basis for retroactive application?; (2) Did the words "shall 
take into consideration" require that in all cases the rate of compensation 
be that on the date of decision or did the words provide the Industrial 
Accident Board with an option to apply the rate existing at the time of the 
injury, once the Board had "considered" the more recent, and ostensibly 
higher rate?; (3) Did "compensation" refer only to the rate at which 
weekly benefits were paid or also refer to the aggregate maximum benefits 
payable under the relevant statute? 
The first question was addressed in Squillante's Case, 3 which dealt with 
the issue of retroactive application of the statute. The case involved a 
claim for disability resulting from exposure to asbestos from 1943 to 
1945. 4 The single member of the division of industrial accidents before 
* LAURENCE S. LOCKE is a partner at the Boston law firm of Laurence Locke & 
Associates, P.C., and is the author of the Massachusetts Practice Series volume on Work-
men's Compensation. 
** THOMAS A. BOYLE, III is an associate with Laurence Locke & Associates. 
§ 7.1. 1 G.L. c. 252, § 51A. 
2 Acts of 1%9, c. 833, § 2. 
3 389 Mass. 396, 450 N.E.2d 599 (1983). 
4 Id. 
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whom the suit was first heard5 found that the employJe had become 
disabled due to asbestosis in September, 1974 as a result of this exposure. 6 
Consequently, the single member ordered the insurer tq pay disability 
benefits to the employee from September, 1974 forward. 7 1In determining 
the amount of compensation, the member applied the rate in effect in 
1945, the date of the plaintiff's last exposure to the freign matter, 
asbestos. 8 The reviewing board and the superior court affi med the single 
member's application of the 1945 rate.9 The employee a pealed on the 
sole issue of the rate of compensation and the Supreme Judicial Court 
ordered direct appellate review on its own initiative. 10 1 
Because of the thirty-nine year time lapse between ~he date of the 
plaintiff's last exposure to asbestos and the date he became disabled, the 
Court addressed the issue of retroactive application of secfion 51A. 11 The 
Court first reaffirmed the principle that the last day that the employee 
worked in 1945 should be considered as the date of injury 'rather than the 
date disability began, September, 1974. 12 According to the Court: "Where 
an employee's injury results from a gradual exposure to harmful foreign 
matter the date of the injury is the date of last exposurd to the foreign 
matter." 13 The Court found section 51 A inapplicable to the case because 
the explicit language of the amendment which adopted s~ction 51A pro-
vided that the provision should apply only to injuries pccurring after 
November 25, 1969. 14 Because the date of injury was 1945, the employee 
was bound by the rate in effect in 1945. 15 , 
The second decision during the Survey year interpreting section 51A, 
McLeod's Case, 16 dealt with the meaning of "shall take into considera-
tion." 17 In McLeod a widow claimed benefits under chapter 152, sections 
31, 32 and 33 as a result of the death of her husband at worJF on August 25, 
1945. 18 Following a hearing, a single member of the Indqstrial Accident 
Board ordered benefits be paid to the claimant at the rates in effect at the 
5 Pursuant to chapter 252, section 8, a single member investigates, hdlds hearings on an 
accident, and files an enforceable decision, subject to review. 
6 389 Mass. at 397, 450 N.E.2d at 599. 
7 Id. at 397, 450 N.E.2d at 599-600. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 397, 450 N.E.2d at 600. 
10 ld. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. ! 
13 ld. (citingSteuterman's Case, 323 Mass. 454 (1948); L. LOCKE, Wo~KMEN's CoMPEN-
SATION § 177, at 192-94 (2d ed. 1981)). 
14 389 Mass. at 397-98, 450 N.E.2d at 600. 
15 Id. 
16 389 Mass. 431, 450 N.E.2d 612 (1983). 
17 Id. at 434, 450 N.E.2d at 615 
18 Id. at 432, 450 N.E.2d at 613. 
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time of the employee's injury. 19 Following an appeal by the insurer, the 
reviewing board affirmed, and adopted the findings and decision of the 
single member on January 28, 1981. 20 Subsequently, the superior court 
affirmed the reviewing board's decision. 21 The claimant then filed a mo-
tion for relief from judgment, asserting for the first time that the correct 
rate of payment pursuant to section 51A should be the compensation rate 
in effect on the date of the superior court's decision, rather than the rate 
available on the date of the employee's injury. 22 The superior court denied 
the claimant's motion. 
Following appeals from both parties, the Appeals Court upheld the 
superior court's decision that the claimant had established her entitlement 
to benefits, but ruled that section 51A required that benefits be paid in 
accordance with the rate in effect on the date of final decision. 23 Further 
appellate review was requested by the insurer solely on the issue of 
whether the Appeals Court had properly interpreted section 51A. 24 
In affirming the decision of the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court first determined that section 51A could be applied in a motion for 
relief from judgment in the superior court despite failure of the claimant to 
assert its applicability either at the Industrial Accident Board hearing or in 
the superior court. 25 In support, the Court cited decisions that allowed the 
initial presentation of an issue at the appellate level where an injustice 
would otherwise result. 26 The Court stressed that the applicability of the 
statute in question was a ''pure question of law,'' that the insurer was not 
deprived of an opportunity to present relevant evidence, and that "[a]ny 
argument that would have been available to the insurer at an earlier state 
of the proceedings is just as available" in that court. 27 
After establishing its jurisdiction to hear the issue before it, the Court 
turned to the proper statutory construction of section 51 A. Although the 
insurer conceded that the word "shall" is generally regarded as manda-
tory, it contended that the meaning of the words "shall take into consid-
eration" in the statute did not require the Industrial Accident Board to 
apply the rates in effect at the time of the final decision in all cases but 
19 Id. at 432, 450 N.E.2d at 613-14. The decision was filed on July 31, 1980. 
20 !d. at 432, 450 N.E.2d at 614. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. Under the rate in effect on the date of the superior court's decision, the claimant 
would receive $110 per week, to a maximum of $32,000. /d. The rate at the time of her 
husband's injury provided for only $55 per week, with a maximum of $16,000. Id. 
23 Id. at 433, 450 N.E.2d at 614. 
24 /d. 
25 !d. at 434, 450 N.E.2d at 614. 
26 Id. 
27 /d. at 434, 450 N.E.2d at 614-15. 
3
Locke and Boyle: Chapter 7: Workmen's Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
204 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 7.1 
only to consider those rates. 28 After considering the rates* the time of its 
decision, the insurer asserted, the board could then apply ~ither the newer 
rates or the rates in effect at the time of the injury. 29 Th~ insurer, citing 
Steuterman 's Case, 30 which held that compensation is paid in accordance 
with the rates in effect at the time of the injury, 31 argued that the Legisla-
ture when enacting section 51A would have been more explicit if intend-
ing to mandate a contrary result. 32 
The Court rejected the insurer's arguments and held that the applicable 
rates were those in effect on the date of the final decision. 33 The operative 
words in the statute, according to the Court, were the jwords "rather 
than,'' which had the effect of excluding consideration by ~'he board ofthe 
rate in effect on the date of injury. 34 In further support of i s decision, the 
Court pointed to the lack of legislative guide!ines for the ndustrial Acci-
dent Board to follow if discretion had been intended. 35 T~ Court stated: 
"In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent, we think it 
unlikely that the Legislature intended to vest in the board unlimited 
discretion to choose between rates of compensation. " 36 The Court indi-
cated, however, that a constitutional challenge to that construction might 
exist but expressed no opinion on the merits of such a challenge. 37 The 
case was remanded for determination of the claimant's !benefits at the 
rates in effect at the time of the computation. 38 I 
The third issue, whether the aggregate maximum to be ~aid to a claim-
ant is also determined as of the date of decision rather t~an the date of 
injury was not directly raised or confronted in either of th~se cases. This 
question was inferentially addressed, however, in McLeod39 when the 
Court, identifying the different rates, noted that "[t]he compensation rate 
for widow's dependency benefits on the date of McLeod's injury was $55 
per week, to a maximum of $16,000 .... The rate in effect on the date of 
the Superior Court decision was $110 per week, to a maximum of 
$32,000. " 40 The Court thus implied that the applicable a~gregate maxi-
mum rate to a claim is the rate in effect on the date of the tina! decision. 
28 Id. at 434, 450 N.E.2d at 615. 
29 Id. 
30 323 Mass. 454, 82 N.E.2d 601 (1948). 
31 Id. at 457, 82 N.E.2d at 602. 
I 
32 389 Mass. at 434, 450 N.E.2d at 615. 




37 Id. at 435 n.4, 450 N.E.2d at 615 n.4. 
38 Id. at 435, 450 N.E.2d at 615. 
39 Id. at 432-33, 450 N.E.2d at 614. 
40 Id. (citations omitted). 
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In summary, the decisions in Squillante 41 and McLeod42 have effec-
tively laid to rest any doubts regarding the mandatory nature of section 
51A and its solely prospective application. Likewise, it is clear that this 
section should be applied in appropriate cases whether or not the issue 
was raised by the claimant. Although not directly addressed, the decision 
in McLeod indicates that the aggregate maximum should also be deter-
mined as of the date of final decision. 
§ 7.2. Injury in Course of Employment- Accident While Driving From 
Place of Employment. During the Survey year, the Appeals Court in 
Maguire's Case 1 held that injuries sustained by an employee in an auto-
mobile accident which occurred while she was driving home to retrieve 
medication prescribed for work-related injuries were not compensable 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 
Maguire's Case involved a teacher who suffered a work-related dental 
injury that initially required treatment with penicillin and codeine, and 
ultimately the extraction of the injured tooth. 3 Following the extraction, 
while driving back to school for the balance of the day, the employee 
began to feel sick, weak and tired. 4 When the employee reached the 
school driveway, she discovered that she had left her codeine medication 
at home. 5 As she was driving home to retrieve the medication, she was 
involved in an automobile accident which caused disabling injuries. 6 
The employee first tried unsuccessfully to establish that the anesthetic 
administered by the dentist caused the accident. 7 A factual determination 
by a single member, however, found no causal relationship between the 
industrial injury to the tooth and the automobile accident. 8 On appeal to 
the reviewing board, the employee changed her position and alleged that 
the injuries resulting from the car accident were work related because the 
accident occurred while she was en route from authorized medical treat-
ment.9 The reviewing board rejected this argument, and the superior court 
affirmed the board's decision. 10 
41 389 Mass. 396, 450 N.E.2d 599 (1983). 
42 389 Mass. 431, 450 N.E.2d 612 (1983). 
§ 7.2. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 451 N.E.2d 446 (1983). 
2 !d. at 339, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 






9 !d. The Appeals Court rejected the insurer's contention that the court could not address 
an issue that had not been raised before the single member./d. at 338 n.1, 451 N.E.2d at 447 
n.l. The court noted that to preserve a question for appeal, the issue can be raised either 
before the single member or before the reviewing board. ld. 
10 Id. at 339, 451 N.E.2d at 447. 
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On appeal, the Appeals Court refused to accept the issue as framed by 
the employee. 11 Instead, the court framed the issue narrowly. According 
to the court, since the employee had already returned from her dentist to 
her place of employment, the issue was "whether an employee is entitled 
to compensation for injuries sustained in an automobile accident occur-
ring while traveling home to retrieve medication prescribed in the treat-
ment of work-related injuries." 12 The Appeals Court ruled that these 
circumstances did not warrant recovery under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and affirmed the judgment of the superior court. 13 
The court reviewed the general principles concerning injuries that arise 
out of employment and indicated that, as a rule, an injury will be com-
pensable if it can be attributed to the "nature, conditions, obligations or 
incidents of the employment; in other words, [to] the employment looked 
at in any of its aspects." 14 The court stated, however, that, unless the 
employment impelled the employee to make the trip, an injury sustained 
while going to or coming from a fixed place of employment does not 
"arise out of" the employment and therefore is not compensable under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 15 
Although the Appeals Court did not decide whether an injury occurring 
while en route to treatment of work-related injuries would be compensa-
ble in Massachusetts, 16 the court reviewed, in dictum, decisions from 
other jurisdictions allowing recovery under those circumstances. 17 The 
court found that the reasoning underlying recovery awards by other 
jurisdictions is that "employers have a duty to pay for medical treatment 
and transportation thereto, and employees have a duty to have injuries 
treated in order to mitigate damages." 18 
The Maguire court noted, however, that, although analogous duties and 
responsibilities of the employer19 and employee20 exist under Massachu-
11 Jd. at 339, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 
12 Id. 
13 ld. 
14 Jd. (citing Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940); Papanastassiou's 
Case, 362 Mass. 91, 93, 284 N.E.2d 598 (1972)). 
15 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 339-40, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 
16 The court specifically noted that the case before it did not present this question. I d. at 
337 n.3, 451 N.E.2d at 448 n.3 .. 
17 Id. at 340, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 
18 Jd. (citing Laines v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 48 Cal. App. 3d 872, 122 
Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975); Taylor v. Centex Constr. Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P. 2d 217 (1963); 
Charles N. Clark Assocs. v. Robinson, 357 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1978); Camp v. Lockheed 
Electronics, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 535, 429 A.2d 615 (1981); Immer and Co. v. Brosnahan, 
207 Va. 720, 152 S.E. 2d 254 (1967)). 
19 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 451 N.E.2d at 448, (citing Levenson's Case, 346 Mass. 508, 
510-13, 194 N.E.2d 103 (1963); Snider's Case, 334 Mass. 65, 70, 134 N.E.2d 16 (1956); and 
G.L. c. 152, § 30, for the proposition that an employer is responsible for costs of medical 
treatment and necessary transportation incurred for work related injuries.) 
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setts law, these duties do not extend to a circumstance where "the 
employee is simply returning to his home to retrieve medicine forgotten 
there. " 21 To distinguish the circumstances in which other jurisdictions 
awarded compensation, the court emphasized that the employer in 
Maguire's Case had no control over the trip and could not verify its 
purposes, in contrast to a scheduled visit for medical treatment. 22 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that the employee in Maguire's Case was on an 
"independent enterprise" 23 and that she was not, at the time of her injury 
due to the automobile accident, "engaged in, nor impelled by, her em-
ployer's business . . . nor did the journey arise out of obligations or 
incidents of her employment." 24 Consequently, the Appeals Court 
affirmed the lower court's denial of compensation for the employee under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 25 
Although the claimant in Maguire's Case was unsuccessful, the court 
offered hope to injured workers who in the future claim injury while en 
route to treatment of work related injuries. The court's review of cases 
allowing such recovery in other jurisdictions demonstrated that the under-
lying bases for such recovery in those jurisdictions - the duty of the 
employer to provide for medical treatment and transportation thereto and 
the duty of the employee to secure medical care- have analogous footing 
in Massachusetts. 26 Accordingly, if the court follows its own dictum, a 
future claimant could receive a more favorable decision if he were injured 
while actually en route to a regularly scheduled medical appointment, or 
to emergency medical treatment, for a work-related injury. 
§ 7 .3. Employee Disability - Series of Stressful Episodes. Blevins's 
Case 1 involved an oil delivery man who claimed disability benefits as a 
result of acute cervical radicular syndrome with extensive osteoarthritis. 2 
The employee's duties required heavy work, including pulling and rolling 
up oil hoses, filling up oil tanks, and working on his truck. 3 Between 
March 8, 1979 and March 23, 1979, while performing work that was more 
than ordinarily stressful, the employee suffered increasing symptoms of 
20 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 451 N.E.2d at 448. An employee is obligated to seek medical 
care. Akin's Case, 302 Mass. 562, 20 N.E.2d 453 (1939); Floccher's Case, 221 Mass. 54, 108 
N.E. 1032 (1915). 
21 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 340, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 
22 !d. at 340-41, 451 N.E.2d at 448-49. 
23 Id. at 341, 451 N.E.2d at 449. 
24 !d. 
25 ld. 
26 Id. at 340, 451 N.E.2d at 448. 
§ 7.3. ' 15 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 443 N.E.2d 1368 (1983). 
2 Id. at 926, 443 N.E.2d at 1369. 
3 !d. 
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pain and numbness in his upper extremities that resulted in his leaving 
work and becoming hospitalized. 4 
The superior court affirmed the decision of the reviewing board, which 
found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury as a result of 
hauling a heavy hose in March, 1979.5 The insurer appealed, arguing that 
the employee's condition resulted from a personal injury sustained in 1%2 
and that his present disability fell within the "wear and tear" doctrine. 6 
In reviewing the facts, the court concluded that, although the case was 
close, the decision by the board could have properly been based on the 
position that the disability resulted in part from a specific series of stress-
ful episodes in March, 1979, rather than from the natural progression of 
the underlying condition. 7 In finding this case compensable, the court 
distinguished the facts from the "wear and tear" cases8 on the basis that 
the onset of the symptoms was not gradual but sudden; that the causally 
related work activity was not mere walking, as in Burns's Case andZerofs-
ki' s Case, but involved heavy hauling; that the work in March was more 
than ordinarily stressful; and that the resulting condition was "not common 
and necessary to all or a great many occupations." 9 
This decision is the first appellate decision concerning the "wear and 
tear" theory since Zerofski .10 In Blevins's Case, the Appeals Court 
affirmed that the line of cases that allows recovery for an injury based on a 
series of stressful episodes 11 has as much vitality as the newly revitalized 
line of cases supporting the "wear and tear" defense. 12 Successful claim-
ants in a close case will have to present evidence that will allow the board 
to find the facts necessary to distinguish a "wear and tear" case from a 
claim involving a compensable injury. 13 
§ 7 .4. Injuries Sustained in Performance of Duty - Statutory Interpreta-
tion of Chapter 41, Section lllF. The claimant in Allen v. Board of 
4 /d. 
5 ld. 
6 /d. For a discussion of the "wear and tear" doctrine, see L. LocKE, WoRKMEN's 
COMPENSATION § 175 (2d ed. 1984). 
7 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 926, 443 N.E.2d at 1369. 
8 /d. at 926-27, 443 N.E.2d at 1369-70, (citing Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. 590, 433 N.E.2d 
869 (1982); Begin's Case, 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968); Spalla's Case, 320 Mass. 
416, 69 N.E.2d 665 (1946); Maggelet's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 972 (1917)). 
9 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 926-27,443 N.E.2d at 1370(quotingZerofski's Case, 385 Mass. at 
594-95, 433 N.E.2d at 869). 
10 Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. 590, 433 N.E.2d 869 (1982). 
11 See Albanese's Case, 378 Mass. 14, 389 N.E.2d 83 (1979); Brzozowski's Case, 328 
Mass. 113, 102 N.E.2d 399 (1951); Pell v. New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co., 325 Mass. 
239, 90 N.E.2d 555 (1950); Trombetta's Case, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 102,294 N.E.2d 484 (1973). 
12 See L. LOCKE, supra note 6. 
13 For a discussion of relevant factors, see Locke, Workmen's Compensation, 1982 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW, § 2.1. 
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Selectmen of Weymouth, 1 decided during the Survey year, was a police 
sergeant who was seriously injured, without fault on his part, while 
returning from court to his home in his own automobile after testifying in a 
criminal matter at the direction of his superiors. 2 He filed an action for 
declaratory relief to determine his right to pay under chapter 41, section 
111P during a disability leave. 4 The Appeals Court, reversing a trial court 
decision, found the sergeant entitled to compensation. 5 
An understanding of the issue, the meaning of the words "sustained in 
the performance of ... duty ," 6 requires a review of prior judicial in-
terpretation of chapter 41, section 111F. Initially, in 1969, the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Petinella v. City of Worcester ,1 in dictum, interpreted 
this language in a restrictive sense as requiring that the injury not only 
have been sustained while in the performance of the officer's duties, but 
also to have resulted from the duties. The Court stated that these dual 
requirements applied in accidental disability retirement claims, also gov-
erned by chapter 41, section 111F.8 In 1975, however, the Court in 
Wormstead v. Town Manager of Saugus 9 specifically overruled this dic-
tum and held that this statute should be given a broader meaning and 
construed in light of decisions interpreting "arising out of and in the 
course of his employment," analogous language found in the compensa-
tion statute. 10 
The claimant in Wormstead was a police officer who was injured in an 
automobile accident while returning to the police station from home 
during an authorized lunch break. He was paid for the lunch break and 
was considered on callY In regard to the police officer's "on call" status, 
the Court noted that in the past he had made arrests and had been called 
back to the station during this break, and sometimes took no break at all. 12 
The Court ruled that consideration of the officer's employment "in all of 
its aspects" would require a decision in the officer's favor. 13 
According to the Court, several pertinent factors controlled its decision 
§ 7.4. 1 15 Mass. App. Ct. 1009, 448 N.E.2d 782 (1983) (rescript opinion). 
2 /d. 
3 G .L. c. 41, § lllF provides for a leave with pay for policemen and firemen injured and 
incapacitated in the performance of duty without fault of the policeman or fireman. 
4 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 1009, 448 N.E.2d at 782. 
5 /d. at 1010, 448 N.E.2d at 783. 
6 G.L. c.41, § lllF. 
7 355 Mass. 412, 245 N.E.2d 451 (1969). 
8 /d. at 415-16, 245 N.E.2d at 453-54. 
9 366 Mass. 659, 322 N.E.2d 177 (1975). 
10 !d. at 663-64, 322 N.E.2d at i74-75. 
11 /d. at 661-62, 322 N.E.2d at 173. 
12 !d. at 665, 322 N.E.2d at 175-76. 
13 /d. at 664, 322 N.E.2d at 175. 
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that the injury was sustained while in the performance of duty. 14 The 
Wormstead Court stressed that the injury occurred during 1a period: 1) for 
which the police officer was being paid; 2) when he was !on call; and 3) 
while he was engaged in activities consistent with and I helpful to the 
accomplishment of police functions. 15 Although the Court specifically 
stated that these three factors were determinative given the facts of that 
case, it did not state that these factors would be a necessacy- element in all 
future cases. 16 ! 
In Allen, the superior court denied compensation because it found that 
the three factors that had been enumerated in Wormstead were not 
present. 17 In reversing the trial judge, the Appeals Court reiterated that 
section 111F is to be interpreted in a manner consistent w1· h chapter 152, 
section 26. 18 According to the court, the superior court ha been too rigid 
in requiring the presence of all three elements from the Wo mstead case. 19 
The Appeals Court held that the Wormstead decisiori stood for the 
principle that whether an injury occurred "in the performance of his 
duties" under section 111 F should be determined on the basis of an 
individual's " 'employment in all of its aspects' includi9g the 'natures, 
conditions, obligations or incidents of the employme1t.' " 20 In this 
broader light, the court easily ruled that the police officer's trip to the 
courthouse to testify was a special mission which was part of the claim-
ant's employment. 21 In dictum, the court noted that a different result 
might have been required if the claimant "had deviated sigqificantly on his 
journey to his house, or had gone off from the courthmise on his own 
affairs.'' 22 
§ 7 .5. Lump Sum Payment to Injured Employee - Enforcement of 
Settlement Agreement Following Employee's Death. Fer~eira v. Arrow 
Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 1 concerns two issues: 1) Can an i~surer unilater-
ally rescind a lump sum agreement subsequent to executioh of the written 
agreement and presentation to the Industrial Accident Board ("Board") 
but prior to its approval?; 2) Does the Board havejurisdict~on to approve, 
,. Id. 
15 Id. 
16 /d. at 664-67, 322 N.E.2d at 175-76. 
17 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 1009-10, 448 N.E.2d at 782-83. 
18 Id. at 1009, 448 N.E.2d at 782-83. 
19 /d. at 1009, 448 N.E.2d at 783. 
20 Id. (citing Swasey's Case, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 395 N.E.2d 884 (1979), quoting 
Papanastassiou's Case, 362 Mass. 91, 284 N.E.2d 598 (1972)). 
21 /d. at 1009, 448 N.E.2d at 783. 
22 /d. at 1010, 448 N.E.2d at 783. 
§ 7.5. 1 15 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 447 N.E.2d 1258 (1983). 
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subsequent to the death of an employee, a settlement redeeming the 
insurer's liability to pay weekly benefits to the employee? 
The insurer and the employee in Ferreira agreed upon a lump sum 
settlement, executed the agreement, and presented it to the Board for 
approval. 2 The parties agreed that the insurer would redeem its liability 
for payment of weekly disability benefits upon payment of $7500. 3 In 
explaining that the agreement was in the best interest of the employee, the 
parties stipulated that the employee was suffering from terminal illnesses 
unrelated to his industrial injury. 4 
After the agreement had been executed by the parties, and a single 
member had recommended its approval, but before the full Board for-
mally approved the agreement, the employee died. 5 On the day following 
the employee's death, the insurer requested that the Board not endorse 
the agreement. 6 Two months later, however, the agreement was ap-
proved.7 
The superior court issued a judgment enforcing the agreement. 8 The 
insurer appealed on the grounds that it had effectively withdrawn from the 
settlement prior to approval, and that the Board lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the employee's right to weekly benefits ceased upon his death. 9 
In rejecting the insurer's argument that it was free to withdraw from the 
agreement prior to formal approval, the Appeals Court found that absent 
fraud, mutual mistake or other equitable principles, "when an instrument 
with the finality of an agreement for redeeming liability has been executed 
and filed with the Division, presented to the single member for approval at 
a hearing conference and recommended for approval by that member, the 
insurer may no longer unilaterally rescind the agreement.'' 10 According to 
the court, this was particularly true where ''the very basis of the agree-
ment was the employee's terminal illness." 11 
Addressing the second issue, the Appeals Court reviewed and relied 
upon Henderson's Case 12 in rejecting the insurer's contention that the 
Board lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreement because 
the employee's right to weekly compensation benefits terminated when he 
'ld. at 633-34, 447 N.E.2d at 1259. 
3 Jd. at 633, 447 N.E.2d at 1259. 
4 ld. 
5 Id. at 634-35, 447 N.E.2d at 1259. 
6 Jd. at 635, 447 N.E.2d at 1259. 
7 Id. 
8 Jd. at 634, 447 N.E.2d at 1259. 
9 Id. at 635, 447 N.E.2d at 1259. 
10 Jd. at 635, 447 N.E.2d at 1259-60. 
11 Id. 
" 333 Mass. 491, 131 N.E.2d 925 (1956). 
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died. 13 The Henderson decision involved a widow's cl~m for benefits 
under chapter 152, section 36 by reason of section 36A. the interplay of 
sections of chapter 152 allows dependents of a deceased iqjured employee 
to recover benefits for loss of function and disfiguremeqt to which that 
employee had become entitled prior to his death. 14 The insurer in Hender-
son argued that the deceased employee had not become entitled to the 
benefits prior to his death because there had been neither a voluntary 
agreement nor a Board decision awarding benefits. Accordingly, the in-
surer asserted, the surviving widow could not recover these benefits. 15 
The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the widow co~ld recover the 
benefits and held that the employee had become entitle~ to the benefits 
upon "the happening of the event upon which the emp~oyee bases his 
claim." 16 The Court pointed out that to hold otherwi$e would allow 
recovery to depend upon factors such as "the duration of the negotiations 
or of the litigation and perhaps upon the interval between the date of 
injury and the date of the death." 17 
The Henderson decision and a similar holding in Bagge's Case 18 were 
followed by the Appeals Court in Ferreira, which affirmed the judgment 
of the superior court. The Ferreira court stated that a£ecision which 
allowed the outcome of a case to depend on arbitrary rna ers such as the 
time lapse between the filing and the approval of a clai would not be 
supported by judicial authority or comply with the settl~d rule that the 
workmen's compensation statute should be liberally cons~rued to protect 
the injured employee. 19 1 
In further support of its holding, the court pointed out tpat chapter 152, 
section 48 provided no language prohibiting the Board from finding subse-
quent to the death of the employee that the settlement was in the em-
ployee's best interest. 20 Additionally, the court also noted that Rule IX(l) 
of the Division of Industrial Accidents provides that the date of execution 
of the agreement, and not the date of approval, is the operative date in 
regard to fixing the amount of the insurer's liability. 21 for all of these 
reasons and in consideration of the general principle that ~he Workmen's 
Compensation Act is to be construed in the best interest df the employee, 
the Appeals Court held that the Board had jurisdiction I to approve the 
settlement subsequent to the employee's death. 22 · 
13 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 636-37, 447 N.E.2d at 1260. 
14 G.L. c. 152, §§ 36, 36A. 
15 333 Mass. at 495, 131 N.E.2d at 927. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 369 Mass. 129, 338 N.E.2d 348 (1975). 
19 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 637, 447 N.E.2d at 1261. 
wu i 
21 Id. at 638, 447 N.E.2d at 1261 (citing Meley's Case, 219 Mass. 1j6, 106 N.E.2d 559 
(1914); G.L. c. 152, § 48). . 
22 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 638, 447 N.E.2d at 1261. 
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The Ferreira decision makes it clear that enforceable approval can issue 
from the Board subsequent to an employee's death, and that once an 
agreement regarding settlement under chapter 152, section 48 has been 
reached, executed and presented to the Board for settlement, it is beyond 
the power of either party to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement. At 
that point, the Board must decide whether the agreement is in the best 
interests of the employee and whether or not to approve it. Each party is 
bound unless he can show that he entered into the agreement due to fraud, 
mutual mistake, or other equitable grounds for rescission. 
§ 7 .6. Lump Sum Settlements - Benefits Subject to Offset - Presump-
tion of Regularity. Harkins v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board 1 
addressed the question of the interplay of certain provisions of chapter 
1522 with chapter 32, section 7, 3 pursuant to the provisions of chapter 32, 
section 14(2)(a). Section 14(2)(a) provides, in part, that certain benefits 
paid to a workmen's compensation claimant who is also eligible for 
accidental disability retirement will be offset against payment of his re-
tirement benefits. 4 Without this offset provision, an injured worker who is 
eligible for workmen's compensation disability benefits could receive 
benefits substantially greater than the income that the worker was earning 
prior to the injury. An analogous offset provision exists regarding claim-
ants who are receiving social security disability benefits. 5 
§ 7.6. 1 15 Mass. App. Ct. 964, 446 N.E.2d 739 (1983) (rescript opinion). 
2 G.L. c. 152, §§ 31, 34, 34A, 35 and 35A. 
3 G.L. c. 32, § 7 provides for accidental disability retirement allowances. 
4 G.L. c. 32, § 14(2)(a) provides: 
(2) All sums of money payable under the provisions of sections thirty-one, thirty-
four, thirty-four A, thirty-five and thirty-five A of chapter one hundred and fifty-two 
directly to a retired member or to the legal representative or dependents of a deceased 
member on account of his death, including so much of the amount of any lump sum 
settlement payable under the provisions of such sections directly to any such person 
as is allocable to the period following the retirement or death of such member, but 
excluding any payments for or amounts allocable to any period prior to the date his 
retirement allowance became effective, shall be offset against and payable in lieu of 
any pension payable on his account under the provisions of section six, seven or nine 
by reason of the same injury, but not against his accumulated total deductions or any 
annuity derived therefrom. Whenever the amount of any such lump settlement is 
payable directly to a beneficiary, the period over which it is allocable for purposes of 
this section shall be determined by the actuary in a manner which is consistent with 
that set forth in paragraph (l)(c) of this section. If any such pension exceeds the 
compensation payable on account of such member under such provisions of chapter 
one hundred and fifty-two when both are reduced to the same periodical basis, the 
excess only shall be paid as a pension so long as such compensation continues. If any 
such pension is less than or equal to such compensation, no pension shall be paid so 
long as such compensation continues to be equal to or greater than such pension. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1982). 
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During the period that a claimant is receiving periodic benefits pursuant 
to chapter 152, sections 31, 34, 34A, 35, or 35A and, at the same time, 
receiving benefits pursuant to chapter 32, section 7 for acci~ental disabil-
ity retirement, the offset situation is clear due to the explicit language of 
the statute. If, however, the workmen's compensation claim is settled by 
means of a lump sum settlement, the question of the amount of offset is 
not so clear because only those benefits paid to a claimant pursuant to 
chapter 152 are subject to offset. The problem becomes det~rmining what 
part of a lump sum settlement, if any, constitutes benefits t~at are subject 
to the offset and what part constitutes benefits that are not subject to the 
offset. In such a case, the insurer and the claimant usually indicate their 
intentions regarding the purpose for the distribution of the payments in 
the body of the lump sum agreement. · 
The claimant in Harkins settled his workmen's compensttion claim by 
means of a lump sum settlement pursuant to chapter 152, section 48.6 
After the local retirement board was granted an offset of the full amount of 
the settlement, $10,000, the aggrieved employee filed an action in superior 
court. The offset was then reduced to $3,000 and the jpdgment was 
appealed by the defendants. 7 
The Appeals Court ruled that the local retirement board ~as not a party 
to the lump sum agreement and was not bound by its provisions. 8 A 
presumption of regularity attaches, however, to settlements approved by 
the Industrial Accident Board. 9 Accordingly, the burden i~ on the local 
retirement board to produce evidence which will allow the h~arings officer 
to make findings concerning whether any of the amounts paid in the 
settlement actually represented amounts due under chapter 152, sections 
31, 34, 34A, 35, or 35A. 10 The court stated that there had been no evidence 
to support a finding that any of the disputed amount wa~ intended for 
payment of benefits under those sections of chapter 152.U!Although the 
Appeals Court ruled that the superior court's judgment was erroneous, it 
affirmed the judgment because the employee had not appealed. 12 
Harkins stands for the principle that a local retirement board is bound 
by the lump sum agreement as approved by the Industrial A~cident Board 
in most instances. To invalidate the disbursements as liste1 on the lump 
sum agreement and establish entitlement to further offset,1 the local re-
tirement board must produce affirmative evidence as to its entitlement. 
Otherwise, the presumption of regularity will attach to the settlement 
regarding the intended distribution. 
6 15 Mass. App. Ct. at %4-65, 446 N.E.2d at 739. 
7 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 965, 446 N.E.2d at 740. 
8 Id. at 964, 446 N.E.2d at 739. 
9 Jd. at %5, 446 N.E.2d at 739-40. 
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